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 “Tolerated use” is a term that refers to the contemporary spread of 
technically infringing, but nonetheless tolerated use of copyrighted works.   
Such patterns of mass infringement have occurred before in copyright 
history, though perhaps not on the same scale, and have usually been settled 
with the use of special laws, called compulsory licensing regimes, more 
familiar to non-copyright scholars as liability rules.   This paper suggests 
that, in present times, a different and slightly unusual solution to the issue of 
widespread illegal use is emerging – an “opt-in” system for copyright holders, 
that is in property terms a rare species of ex post notice right.   In addition, 
this paper proposes a several ways to deal with tolerated use problems, 
including a complement-driven theory of derivative works, and the “copyright 
no action policy.” 
 
 1. The Rise of Tolerated Use 
 
 Copyrighted works are today used in many ways they once were not.   
There is a giant “grey zone” in copyright, consisting of millions of usages that 
do not fall into a clear category but are often infringing.  These usages run 
the gauntlet, from powerpoint presentations, personal web sites, social 
networking sites, church services,1 and much of wikipedia’s content to well-
known fan guides.  Such casual and often harmless uses of works comprise 
the category of tolerated use, whose discussion is the purpose of this first 
section. 
 
 The critical aspect of this phenomenon are uses of works that are of a 
mass quantity and low value per transaction.   Copyright’s property 
structure, like most property systems, works best given relatively few 
                                            
† Professor, Columbia Law School.  Copyright © Tim Wu 2007.  I wish to 
thank Luis Villa, members of the Columbia IP colloquium, the 10-10 workshop and 
Douglas Lichtman and Jane Ginsburg for comments.  I also thank Andrew Cohen for 
helpful suggestions. 
1 Brian D. Wassom, Copyright Infringement in Worship Services: Problems 
and Potential Solutions, 36 JOURNAL OF ARTS MANAGEMENT, LAW & SOCIETY 2, 127-
160 (Summer 2006). 
3 See John Tehranian, INFRINGEMENT NATION:  COPYRIGHT REFORM 
AND THE LAW/NORM GAP, 3 Utah L. Rev. 537, 543-47 (2007). 
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significant uses of a given work that are each of high value.  Today’s world of 
mass low-value infringement is a different world. 
 
 The magnitude of such casual infringement is naturally hard to 
measure.  In a paper entitled “Infringement Nation,” performing what he 
calls a “gedankenexperiment,” Professor John Tehranian calculates the 
potential copyright liability that a university professor might incur as he 
responds to emails, photocopies articles, goes swimming, and recites poetry. 
He arrives at a hypothetical figure of over $12 million.3   While the 
hypothetical is meant to be a bit goofy (a tattoo of “Captain Caveman” is 
among the sources of liability) Tehranian makes the point clearly that beyond 
true piracy, casual copyright infringement is sometimes a near-unavoidable 
part of many people’s days. 
  
The reason that there is such a giant grey zone in copyright today is 
often discussed.4  Once upon a time, even as recently as the 1960s, it was 
difficult to infringe the copyright law.   One needed a printing press, a radio 
station, or a means of pressing records, and such facilities were not owned by 
many. Today every man, woman, corporation and child has the technological 
ability to copy and distribute, and therefore to potentially infringe copyright 
in ways both harmful and harmless. That ability should be celebrated but it 
has created great and by now well-known challenges for the law. 
 
One problem is that copyright lacks a vocabulary to describe what is 
happening in the 21st century. To help get a handle on what is going on, this 
section attempts to clarify and classify some of the uses of copyrighting works 
that may have already existed, but have emerged more prominently over the 
last twenty years or so.5  
 
 Traditionally, we might say that copyright comprehended five main 
categories of usage.  They are (1) infringing use, (2) non-infringing use, (3) 
privately licensed use, (4) publicly licensed, or statutory use, and (5) fair use.   
The first category includes usage of a right owned by the owner of the 
copyrighted work without permission.  The second category includes uses of 
copyrighted works that are non-infringing to begin with, such as private 
performances, and the use of a de minimis amount of a work.  The third 
                                            
4 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright 111 (2001) (“Our copyright laws 
have, until now, focused primarily on the relationships among those who write 
works of authorship and disseminate those works to the public.”); Jane C. Ginsburg, 
Putting Cars On The “Information Superhighway”: Authors, Exploiters, and 
Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1466, 1488 (1995) (discussing the role of 
intermediaries).  
5 Cf. Julie Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 347  (a consideration of copyright’s users). 
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category includes all privately licensed use by a person with the necessary 
permissions, including use, from the owner.  Usage pursuant to a compulsory 
license regime (like that for “cover songs”) and usage pursuant to the 
statutory 17 U.S.C. §108 (archival) or §110 (performance) exceptions are in 
the fourth category, while the fifth category, which is technically a statutory 
exception as well, is the broader right of fair use. 
 
 Fig 1. Traditional Categories 
 
 Infringing Use 
 Non-infringing Use 
 Privately Licensed Use 
 Publicly Licensed use 
 Fair Use 
 
 In simpler times, perhaps most of copyrighted use might have fallen 
into these categories, or at least enough so that other categories were not 
important.  However, since the 1970s and 1980s, when copying became 
something of which individuals were capable, the usage landscape has 
changed.6   In the last twenty years, some new categories of usage have 
developed, and here we can describe several - some well known, other less so. 
 
 The first is implicitly licensed use.  Here, usage is licensed not by 
explicit contract but by an implied contract created by conduct or notice of 
one kind or another.   Implicit licenses are by now a familiar part of the 
copyright scene, appearing in well-known cases like Cohen v. Effects 
Associates, and others.7 
 
 The second is the category of tolerated use studied here.8   Tolerated 
use is infringing usage of a copyrighted work of which the copyright owner 
may be aware, yet does nothing about.   There may be a variety of reasons for 
tolerating use.  Reasons can include simple laziness or enforcement costs, a 
desire to create goodwill, or a calculation that the infringement creates an 
economic complement the copyrighted work -- it actually benefits the owner.  
 
                                            
6 For a discussion of the changes in use of copyrighted works and related 
instances of individual enforcement, see, e.g.,  Jane Ginsburg, Copyright and Control 
over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (2001); Tim Wu, 
Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278 (2004). 
 
7 See, e.g., Effects Assoc., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990). 
8 For a discussion of “tolerated use,” see Tim Wu, Does YouTube Really have 
Legal Problems?, SLATE, Oct. 26, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2152264. 
10 17 U.S.C. §106 (2000). 
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 As discussed earlier, parts of various fan sites and fan fiction sites that 
can be easily found on the internet typify tolerated use.  Take for example, 
the fan site for the popular TV show Lost, broadcast by ABC, which is called 
the “Lostpedia.”   Among other things, the Lostpedia posts full transcripts of 
the program; such postings are almost certainly copyright infringement.   But 
nothing is done, not because ABC is lazy, but because it doesn’t think suing 
the Lostpedia is a good idea.   Such lack of enforcement against fan sites 
seems to represent copyright owners’ judgment that the infringing uses are 
complementary to the main copyrighted products – or put more simply, than 
fan sites will increase, not hurt, demand for the show. 
  
 What is the difference between tolerated use and implicitly licensed 
use?  The difference is legal.  In the case of an implicit license you could, if 
brought to court, point to some conduct or writing that creates permission to 
engage in the activity in question.   For example, many newspapers and 
magazines, such as the New York Times, provide a way for readers to email 
articles.   Such emailing constitutes both a “reproduction” and a 
“distribution” of the articles under the copyright law.10    However, were 
someone sued for such emailing would have a defense: that by clearly 
encouraging readers to email stories, the paper had implicitly created a 
contract — a non-exclusive license – permitting the reader to email the 
stories to friends. 
 
 By contrast, in a tolerated use scenario, there is no such contract, 
extant and impliable.  Instead, what the defense, if any, is a fair use 
argument of some kind, an argument that the laches of the copyright owner 
should bar recovery (equity aids the vigilant),11 or possibly a statute of 
limitations defense.  The main point is that that the liability likely exists, but 
it is simply a matter of non-enforcement.  The difference from an implied 
contact should be clear.  
 
 I just mentioned fair use -- is there a difference between tolerated use 
and fair use?  Many of the uses that fall into the category of tolerated use 
might also arguably fall close in the category of fair use.12  Hence an 
                                            
11 See MARY J. KLING v. HALLMARK CARDS INC., 225 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 
2000) (discussing laches in the copyright context); see also Black's Law Dictionary 
875 (6th ed. 1990) (" 'Doctrine of laches,' is based upon maxim that equity aids the 
vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights. It is defined as neglect to assert 
a right or claim which, taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances 
causing prejudice to the adverse party, operates as bar in court of equity") 
12  Fair use is a broad exception for various uses of copyrighted works that, by 
operation of the statute or common law, are considered fair.   17 U.S.C. §107 (2000).  
The best known examples are matters like educational uses, the use of copyrighted 
materials in reporting, parodies, and so on. 
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alternative way to describe what is happening today not as mass 
infringement, but rather a massive and fully legal exploitation of the fair use 
doctrine. 
 
 The problem with this description is that it isn’t really clear whether it 
is right as a positive law matter – because we don’t, in fact, know how many 
of today’s casual mass infringements a court would find to be fair use.  That’s 
because, thanks to the inherent vagueness in the concept of fair use, and with 
the costs of litigation, the contours of fair use for casual infringement has not 
been and may never be well mapped out.13  That makes it difficult to 
differentiate between use that is tolerated and that which is fair.    
 
Take once again, for example, a typical internet fan guide.  The 
copyright status of such guides is tricky; some parts are almost certainly fair 
use; other parts tolerated use; and other parts simply outside of the owner’s 
control, falling outside the §106(2) adaptation right in the first place.   Yet 
even if we accept a fairly generous notion of what counts as fair use, there 
remain many uses of copyrighted materials that are widespread and 
tolerated as opposed to fair. 
 
 By this point, I hope I have convinced you that there is a large category 
of technically infringing uses of copyrighted works that is neither clearly in 
the category of fair use, nor in the category of being implicitly or explicitly 
licensed.   The next question is what the law is doing in reaction. 
 
 2. Notice Based Property Rights 
 
 In this section, I’ll suggest that one of the law’s reactions to the rise of 
tolerated use is to develop various systems that make parts of copyright 
operate in a new way.   It is the creation of “opt-in” copyright enforcement 
systems that requires the owner to provide notice before the usage of a work 
becomes infringing.  Another way of describing this approach is a move 
toward an ex post notice property system.   In this section, I’ll make an effort 
to explain what such a system looks like and to provide some examples. 
 
                                            
13 Things are made more complex by the fact that the fair use doctrine, 
reflecting its common-law origins, can and does evolve.  A usage of a copyrighted 
work that was at one point infringing but tolerated might later on become a form of 
fair use as an adjustment to changed conditions, and vice versa. 
Tolerated Use 
 6 
 Most property rights lead to a liability at the moment of trespass, 
without further action necessary.14  In real property law, if you walk onto 
Blackacre without permission, you become a trespasser at that moment.  
 
 But the pattern just described is just one possible configuration.  
Another scheme is one of “notice based” property rights—whereby an 
intrusion only becomes a trespass if some action is undertaken by the owner.   
Notice based rights can be of two types.   The first are advance notice rights, 
where, for example, a “no trespassing” sign is required to convert an 
intrusion into a trespass.   A far rarer species, but the subject of this paper, is 
the ex post notice right, or the “opt-in,” where use of the property is “safe,” or 
not illegal,  until the owner takes some action—typically, complaining or 
issuing notice.  At that point, continued use becomes illegal, but, importantly, 
usage up to that point is excused.   
 
 Advance notice rights are relatively common in American law.  In the 
copyright context, for example, proper copyright notice on a work was long a 
prerequisite to the creation of an enforceable right. 15  In real property, many 
states in rural areas deem posting “Keep Off” or similar sentiments as a 
perquisite to trespass liability.16   Advance notice is interesting but not the 
main concern of this paper. 
 
 The ex post notice right, also called an “opt-in” right or a right subject 
to a “safe harbor,”  is a much rarer creature.  These are rights that require 
action after trespass to create liability – absent complaint, there is no wrong 
committed.  As a species of what Ian Ayres calls “dual-chooser” rights, these 
rights have been mainly a topic of theoretical interest, rather like a rare 
subatomic particle.17  Whatever the prevalence of dual chooser rights in other 
contexts, over the last decade, in ways formal and informal, copyright has in 
various areas begun to take on the attributes of a dual-chooser regime.  That 
is, copyright has begun in various areas to require action by both parties to 
“arm” the right.   
                                            
14 Another way to describe such rights is as “single chooser” rights The “single 
chooser” and “dual chooser” language comes from Ian Ayres.  IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL 
LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS ch . 3-4 (2005).  
15 See Copyright Act of 1909.   Today, sections 17 U.S.C. §104A(d)-(e) 
represent a vestigial notice regime.  They require notice of intent to enforce a 
restored copyright: a global notice filed with the copyright office, or (if the restored 
owner misses the global notice filing deadline) individually-served notice is required 
to enforce the restored copyright against reliance parties (no notice required as to 
alleged infringers who don’t qualify as reliance parties).   For example of notice, see 
supra note 5..    
16 See, e.g., Title 21, § 11-2115 of New York State Environmental 
Conservation Law.  




We begin with several formal examples.  The first and perhaps most 
important example is the usage covered by §512 of the Copyright Act -- the 
DMCA “safe harbor.”    Relevant to our purposes, §512 immunizes search 
engines (like Yahoo) and hosts of user-directed content (like a web-hosting 
site) from copyright liability until sent explicit notice of the infringing use 
(notice) and until the entity fails to take down the content subject to notice.   
For this reason, §512 is referred to as a “notice and takedown” system.18  
 
 While, technically, the users become liable at the moment they upload 
infringing content, the economically relevant actor is often the search engine 
or hosting firm.  And to that actor, the copyright regime has an opt-in right 
cast.   Despite facilitating infringement, liability does not “activate” unless 
and until the owner takes action (sending notice).   
 
 A second and less well-known example concerns non-profit 
performance of copyrighted works.   Under the copyright statute, non-profit 
performances are, subject to certain conditions, allowable unless the 
copyright owner objects and serves notice.19   Stated otherwise, non-profit 
organizations may safely use non-dramatic works unless and until they 
receive notice of an objection. 
 
 A third area is orphan works.  Works without an owner who can be 
located are generally recognized as creating problems.  In 2006, the 
Copyright Office recommended a statutory amendment to deal with the 
orphan works problem.20   That amendment would create another version of 
an ex post notice-based copyright scheme.   Provided the user performed a 
diligent search for the owner of a copyright, he would be free to use a 
copyrighted work, subject only to a duty to stop doing so should the actual 
owner reappear and demand the use of her work be stopped.    While different 
in some respects from our other examples, the proposed scheme is similar in 
pattern, since it is designed to make use of orphaned rights safer.  
 
 The fourth area surrounds the ongoing Google Books litigation. 
Google’s book search program has taken thousands of books, and created a 
searchable database which displays excerpts of the books.21  Sued by the 
owners of the copyrights in the scanned books, in litigation, Google has 
                                            
18 For the original, judicially created takedown regime, see Religious Tech. 
Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commun. Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (D. Cal. 1995) 
19 17 U.S.C. §110(4)(b)(3). 
20 See UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 
(2006), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf. 
21 For a good introduction, see Jeffrey Toobin, Google’s Moon Shot, THE NEW 
YORKER, February 5, 2007 at 30. 
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claimed a right, under the fair use doctrine (§107 of the Copyright Code), to 
provide searchable excerpts of copyrighted works.22  Meanwhile, a relevant 
fact in the case is that Google will take down the work should the owner 
surface and so request. 
  
 Google believes that its book program is fair use with or without its 
“opt-out” feature.  But a judge may think differently, and make the “opt-out” 
a necessary aspect of the fair use defense.   If a court did so, it will have used 
§107 to create a right that requires notice to become active - in other words, 
an opt-in right.  (What is opt-in and opt-out here has become a bit confusing, 
and for that I apologize). 
 
 I’m not the only one preoccupied with the opt-out aspects of the Google 
books litigation.  In Standing Copyright on Its Head, The Googlization of 
Everything and the Many Faces of Property, Professor Oren Bracha directs 
his attention to that aspect of the case, and the importance of the opt-in/opt-
out issue for the future.23  As he puts it, we face a future of “mass aggregation 
of informational items under conditions in which the cost of ascertaining and 
clearing legal rights in each item is nontrivial.  Under such conditions the 
opt-out or ‘opt-in’ question is very likely to become, metaphorically speaking, 
a question of life and death.”24 
 
The final example is the informal equivalent to the above, created by 
policies of selective enforcement.   In the world of tolerated use, most 
copyright owners do not enforce their rights to anything close to the statutory 
limit, particularly with respect to the adaptation right.    Non-enforcement 
leads to a system where non-commercial users, especially on the internet, use 
the work and only stop using if issued a cease and decease letter.   Unlike the 
other examples, this is not a formal opt-in right scheme, but rather an 
informal practice that nonetheless creates the same system. 
 
 These five real world examples are imperfect illustrations of the legal 
creation of a right that has ex post notice characteristics.   (To some extent, 
they may represent a quiet return of notice requirements, albeit in an 
unusual form, to the copyright world, where they have been absent since 
1976.)  
 
The unusual form of the opt-in right is interesting in its own respect as 
a matter of property theory.  This paper does not take a strong position on 
whether the arrival of ex post notice rights in copyright might be a good or 
                                            
22 Eric Schmidt, Books of Revelation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2005,  available at  
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB112958982689471238.html. 
23 85 Texas L. Rev. 1799 (2007). 
24 Id. at 1803. 
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bad thing.   Just as liability and property rules are useful in different 
scenarios, notice rights are not universally useless or useful.  Instead, the 
rest of this paper will try to describe why opt-in or safe harbor regimes are 
becoming more common, and points out circumstances in which such regimes 
might produce useful outcomes.  Specifically, this paper explores the use of 
safe harbor regimes as alternatives to property and liability rules - 
copyright’s main answer to most of the problems it faces. 
 
 2. Notice Rights in the Cathedral 
 
 Property and Liability Rules 
 
 In property theory, a property right is characterized by two 
characteristics important to this paper.  The first is the availability of 
injunctive relief.  The second is liability that arises regardless of any action 
on the part of the property owner.   That configuration, of course, is obviously 
not the only way to structure a legal entitlement.   The best known 
alternative to the property rule just described varies the first characteristic -- 
the availability of injunctive relief, creating what is usually called a liability 
rule.25 
  
 The difference between a liability rule and property rule, in Guido 
Calabresi and Douglas Melamed’s original formulation, is in the form of 
relief: in a liability regime, the trespasser is charged or may pay a fee 
(statutory or set by a court) for the trespass.   For example, in real property, 
the Government may take property so long as it pays “just compensation.”  In 
copyright, anyone has the right to make a “cover” of a copyrighted song, upon 
payment of a fixed fee (originally two cents per copy) to the owner of the 
copyright in the composition.26 
 
 There is a longstanding and perhaps never-ending debate over when 
and where a liability or a property regime might be a better choice.  Property 
rules are said to have the advantage of forcing the parties to bargain for the 
transfer of the right, and to therefore facilitate transactions in an 
environment where transaction costs are low.27   The idea is that the property 
right that I have in my house forces you to bargain with me if you want to 
                                            
25 See Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).  I 
ignore here the fact that property rules can also be classified as a form of liability 
rule with extremely high prices; high enough that few people would pay the price to 
engage in the activity in question. 
26 See Copyright Act of 1909, §1(e). 
27 See id. at 1106-1110; ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 100 (1988). 
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buy it, rather than going to the local government official to see what price she 
might set.  Liability rule advocates contest the premise that property rights 
facilitate transactions, suggesting that liability rules are, in fact, more likely 
to force bargaining, given the prospect of a judicial setting of the price for the 
entitlement.28 
 
 A chief advantage of property rights is the price mechanism.  Since a 
property system requires an individualized transaction for every transaction, 
it should be expected, in a robust market, to generate more accurate prices 
than a blanket price set by government or a private rights-holding 
organization.  To make the example obvious, if Manhattan homes were priced 
by Congress at a flat fee of $1000 / square foot, the prices might be less 
reflective of actual supply and demand than the prices arrived at by private 
bargaining.29  As the example suggests, liability rules look particularly 
unattractive when a legislature sets a blanket price for a class of rights that 
may vary in value quite a bit.  A  judicial liability rule, like a damage verdict 
in a tort lawsuit, is still a government set price, but one more sensitive to 
context. 
 
 Liability rules have obvious advantages where bargaining is likely to 
fail or be very difficult.  That may happen for a variety of reasons. It may be 
because the parties are strangers who don’t meet before the transaction (as in 
a car accident).  It might be that the market is thin—has too sparse a record 
of transactions for effective bargaining (no one knows how much something is 
worth, so the negotiations break down).30   Or, in what is almost the opposite 
kind of problem, a bargaining failure can occur due to the sheer number of 
rights-holders, so that the transaction costs of agreeing to a transfer become 
too high for deals to be made.31  For these and other reasons a bargained-for 
transaction may break down, making a property system less useful.  
 
 In the field of copyright, we find liability rules (including zero-price 
liability rules, i.e., commons regimes) in a variety of these situations.  Private 
organizations like ASCAP create “blanket licenses” for radio stations who 
want to license a large collection of songs in one transaction.   The fair use 
system creates zero-price liability rules (normally referred to as defenses to 
                                            
28 See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining, 104 YALE L. J. 1027 
(1995). 
29 See, e.g., Robert Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual 
Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996). 
30 Ayres & Talley, supra note 22. 




liability) in situations where bargaining is likely to fail.32   For example, fair 
use rights are granted to parodists based on the assumption that bargaining 
over a work designed to humiliate the original author has a good chance of 
breaking down.   Finally, over the history of copyright, a variety of 
government set licensing regimes, known as compulsory licenses, have 
emerged as settlements to conflicts between industries.33   For example, cable 
operators have the right, on the payment of a fixed fee, to retransmit the 
copyrighted content of television broadcasters.34  The compulsory licenses, 
which tend to cover scenarios with a huge number of rights, are licensed for a 
single fixed price, eliminating transactional problems. 
 
 Notice Rules 
  
 In the spirit of work exploring alternatives to the choice between 
property and liability rules, this paper addresses the role of notice, and in 
particular, ex post notice in the structuring of entitlements.   The use of 
notice rights can serve as a mechanism for dealing with some of the 
transactional problems that liability rules are designed to address.  Like a 
liability rule, an ex post notice regime can overcome certain classes of 
transaction cost problems—namely, and most importantly, anti-commons 
problems.   But more important is the possibility that safe harbors may help 
solve certain types of information problem, by forcing greater disclosure of 
private information important for accurate valuation of an entitlement. 
 
 In most American states, hunters have a right to hunt on unenclosed 
land unless the land-owner posts a sign that says “Keep Out,” “No Hunting” 
or something similar.35   Most of these laws emerged in a time when hunting 
was a more economically significant activity today, and that must be kept in 
mind for this discussion.    
 
 What economic purpose is served by a posting law?   In a typical 
property rule or liability rule scenario, the potential trespasser may be 
deterred by the existence of legal liability.   In the absence of a posting law 
unused land that is good for hunting might be wasted, because of uncertainty 
as to whether the hunting is illegal.  The notice requirement prompts the 
owner to disclosure private information if, for some reason hunting on the 
land in question might be particularly harmful. 
                                            
32 Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982). 
33 See Wu, supra note 4.   
34 17 U.S.C. §111 (2000). 
35 These statutes are collected in Mark R. Sigmon, Hunting And Posting On 





 There may be plenty such reasons.  It might be the case that the land 
in question is frequently used by children to play hide-and-seek, a usage 
likely to be incompatible with the hunting of wild animals with firearms.  On 
the other hand, there might be no reason not to let people hunt: the land may 
be simply be held empty, and would experience no loss in value from hunting.  
In either case, the owner is the most likely person to have information 
bearing on the question, and the requirement of incurring the costs of posting 
forces him to disclose it. 36 
 
 It is probably not accurate to describe notice regimes as an alternative 
to liability or property rules.   But notice regimes are targeted at the same 
problem—namely, moving an entitlement to its highest and best usage.  By 
forcing the original rights owner to take the action of communicating notice, 
notice regimes can uncover rights that are, in fact, either hold no value by 
their owners, or usages that are compatible with existing usages. 
 
 Ex post Notice Rights 
 
 Ex ante or advance notice regimes are relatively common.   Copyright 
law, for example, was long an ex ante notice regime.   Until the passage of the 
1976 Copyright Act, to obtain copyright protection, an owner was required to 
publish works with proper notice of copyright protection, as described by 
                                            
36 Land-posting and other notice rules are either related to, or species of, the 
“dual chooser” rules described by Paul Goldbart and Ian Ayres.  See Ian Ayres & 
Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal Deregulation and Decoupling in the Design of Liability 
Rules, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2001). Typically, property and liability rules are 
modeled as “single chooser” rules.  Take, for example, the compulsory license of 2 
cents to record a copyrighted song.  The defendant (not the owner) decides whether 
or not to pay the fixed fee in exchange for the entitlement to record the song.    In a 
dual chooser regime, as Goldbart and Ayres write, both the original owner and the 
trespasser have “a potential impact on how the entitlement is allocated.”   The 
simplest example is a rule whereby both parties have to agree to the fixed price for it 
to become an active liability rule.   Another example is a rule whereby a trespasser 
gets the entitlement unless both parties agree that the entitlement should be 
allocated to the plaintiff.  
As Goldbart and Ayres admit, dual-chooser rules can seem “esoteric and 
otherwordly.”  Id. at 36.  While they claim otherwise, finding intuitive real world 
examples of such rules is not easy.  For the purposes of this paper, what matters 
about the dual chooser model is the notion of an entitlement scheme as one that 
requires choices on the part of both the owner and trespasser to determine the 
existence of legal liability. 
39 See Copyright Act of 1909 §§10, 19, 20 (1909). 
Tolerated Use 
 13 
statute.39   As described above, in most states unenclosed land includes rights 
that require postings to become active.   Landlord-tenant law is full of 
advance notice requirements that activate rights, like the notice required 
before entering a renter’s property. 
 
 This paper focuses on a slightly more unusual notice regime -- the ex 
post notice system.   As discussed already, the difference is that that the 
owner must provide notice to the trespasser after the trespass for the 
trespass to become illegal.   In other words, the trespasser is in the clear, 
unless and until she receives appropriate notice from the owner of the 
property. 
 
  At first glance it may seem that the pattern just described is the same 
as a normal property right.   If a nearby baseball stadium is noisy to the level 
of nuisance, I have to take action (filing a suit) to have a court issue a fine or 
an injunction.  The critical difference, at least as I’m choosing to describe the 
issues, is that we don’t usually think of filing of a complaint as an action that 
creates liability:  the liability is there, and the lawsuit is a form of 
enforcement.  (I should warn the reader that I sometimes will treat filing a 
lawsuit as a form of notice, for this inconsistency I apologize).   In our 
baseball stadium example, we assume such noise is illegal at the moment it 
begins and therefore that the baseball stadium must factor that risk into its 
decision whether or not to open.  
 
 Sometimes the difference between an notice regime and a normal 
liability or property rule may seem irrelevant.  If the trespasser is making a 
sizable, irreversible investment (as in the case of the stadium), whether 
building is illegal at the outset or becomes illegal later probably makes little 
difference.  But like many rights configurations, a regime that is useless in 




 Here I describe two idealized scenarios where an ex poste notice 
regime might be useful.  
 
 The Physics Library.   Consider the company PL, willing to spend up to 
$15 million to create a downloadable library of 100,000 academic papers 
published in physics, where each paper has a separate owner.   We may 
assume that the fair market licensing value of 90% of the papers is 10 cents, 
(the “bad papers”) while the value of 10% of the papers (the “good papers”) is 
$1000 each.   At the outset, PL does not know which papers are bad and 




 In a world of perfect information and zero transaction costs, the 
library, under our assumptions, could be built for $10,009,000.  That’s $1,000 
paid to each of the 10,000 owners of valuable papers, and 10 cents paid to the 
90,000 remaining owners.   It would therefore be built. 
 
 But if we add transaction costs and lack of information, matters 
change.  If it costs, on average, $100 of time and search costs to contact any 
individual in our world, then (excluding licensing fees), the library will cost 
$10 million ($100 x 100,000 authors) to build, plus $10,009,000 in licensing 
fees.  The cost of reaching the author is what prevents the library from being 
built.  This is an example of transaction costs themselves, as opposed to 
licensing prices, blocking a transaction, a problem often called an anti-
commons problem. 
 
 One solution to the problem is a liability rule.   If government or a 
private organization40 sets a price of $100 for the rights to each paper, no 
money need be spent searching for owners.  The library will cost $10 million 
and will be built.   That is a favorable outcome that saves $10 million in 
transaction costs, but it is also a suboptimal outcome in other ways.   It 
wastes money by overcompensating the vast majority of copyright owners, 
while undercompensating others.  It does all of this because it makes the 
centralized informational assumption that each paper is worth the same.  In 
our model, there is no device for extracting better price information. 
 
 The ex post notice, or a safe habor, regime offers a different solution to 
the problem.   The structure of a safe habor allows PL to build the library 
first.  After the library exists, all owners who value their rights over $100 
(the costs of finding and contacting any person) will do so, and demand 
payment for a license to their works (for $1,000, under our assumption).   
Those who value their rights less than $100 will not contact PL.   The library, 
under these assumptions, will be built for $10,000,000 (10,000 good papers x 
$1,000) or slightly less than the price in a world of no transaction costs. 
 
 The advantages of the ex poste regime in this idealized example are 
obvious.   The owners of valuable papers are compensated at $900 ($1000 
minus $100 in the search costs they incur searching for PL), which is less 
than in a world of perfect information, but more than under the compulsory 
licensing regime.   The trick with the safe harbor regime is that it flips the 
economics of transaction costs.  It forces the owner to divulge private 
information as to the value of the right—in particular, it makes clear 
whether the value of the right to the owner is less than zero. 
 
                                            




 Fandom.   Consider the TV producer BCA (Broadcast Company of 
America), creator and copyright owner of the TV show “Island.”   “Island” has 
millions of fans, and 100,000 of whom who wish to use the content of island is 
various ways, such as contributions to a fan site, artwork, encyclopedias, and 
so on, as well as those who’d simply like to distribute the show. 
 
 To simplify things we can assume that every proposed usage is 
infringing.   Of the usage, we might assume that 90,000 of the users are good, 
and will voluntarily produce content with a value of $100 to copyright owner, 
as marketing for the original work, or otherwise (total of 9,000,000).   10,000, 
meanwhile, are bad users, who will use the work in a way that diminishes 
the value of the original work by $1000, either as a substitute for a product 
the owner is creating, or some kind of tarnishment. 
 
 In a world with perfect information and no transaction costs, the 
copyright owner would license the 90,000 positive uses and prohibit the 
10,000 negative uses, creating a surplus of  $9 million. 
 
 In another world, we might assume the owner has two options:  (1) tell 
all users to stop, and (2) let all users do what they like.   Neither is perfect.   
If the owner forces all users to stop, he forgoes $9 million in marketing, plus 
the costs of 100,000 cease and desist letters, which we can assume, as above, 
cost $100, for a total cost of $10 million. 
 
Otherwise the owner can let users do what they like, gaining the $9 
million in marketing but losing $10 million in tarnishment and subsitution.   
Given the costs of enforcement under these assumption, non-enforcement is 
the better option – at a cost of $1 million. 
 
 What the owner wants is a relatively low cost way of distinguishing 
between good users and bad users.   One way is the equivalent of an opt-in 
regime – allowing users to do what they like, and then trying to block the 
uses that are harmful, as opposed to simply infringing.    If the user is able to 
spend 10,000 x $100, or $1 million, chasing only the substituting users, he 
ends up with $9 million in marketing, minus the million in enforcement 
costs, for a total of $8 million. 
 
 What I’ve just described is an approximation of what large copyright 
owners are doing in response to many of the uses of their work: that is, 
tolerating most infringment, and enforcing only as against the costly 
varieties.    However, the trick is to enforce without deterring complementary 
use of the underlying work – something the “No Action Policy,” described 




* * * 
 
 These two examples suggest that ex poste regimes may be most useful 
in situations high volume, low value situations.  Or, stated otherwise, when: 
 
• Large number of property rights need be licensed, or large number 
of uses are present; and 
• The actual value of the rights or usage is known best by its owner; 
and 





There are a few problems or challenges with the ex ante notice 
schemes described here.  The first is scalability.   The Physics Library 
features just a single user and large numbers of copyright owners.   But what 
if there is not a single Physics Library, but ten, or if the number of libraries 
becomes as large as the number of users?    In that case, the copyright owner, 
even if he has private information suggesting the value of the work, himself 
faces disabling transaction costs.   As we let the number of libraries begin to 
approach infinity, the pain of transaction costs is felt on both sides.   Douglas 
Lichtman crystallizes this concern by saying that “opt-out will quickly 
become an expensive and futile game of whack-a-mole for copyright 
holders.”41    
 
This may suggest that the utility of an ex poste right structure 
depends on being right about what side the bulk of the transaction costs lie 
on one or another side.   The Physics Library example relies on an 
assumption which seems fair, that there will be far more physics papers than 
serious libraries; that is the foundation of the argument in that context.   
 
The more general point is this.  Every time copyright allocates the duty 
to seek a license to the user or owner, respectively, it is making a guess about 
where the bulk of the transaction costs lie.   Today the default is to allocate 
those costs to the user, which may make sense for many situations.  But 
surely not always – or we wouldn’t ever think fair use or compulsory licenses 
were a good idea.  As Oren Bracha argues, “the normative question of 
whether and under which circumstances digital libraries should enjoy an opt-
out-based safe haven cannot be answered on the basis of copyright’s 
‘nature.’”42 
  
                                            
41 See Douglas Lichtman, email to Tim Wu, Feb 15, 2008. 
42 Bracha, supra n. 23, at 1811. 
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Finally, and interestingly, when the number of infringements is large 
or approaches infinity (as in the Addictive Program example), a different 
dynamic takes over.    Since the transaction costs of trying to license the use 
of hundreds of thousands of infringers is overwhelming, it puts the owner in a 
ex poste notice situation whether he likes it or not.     
 
A second criticism of the foregoing suggests that the models I’ve used 
are too static, particularly as pertains to transactions costs.  The point runs 
something like this.  It may be true that an opt-in right is useful when the 
transactions costs of licensing are greater than the value of the usages in 
question.  However, what the discussion here ignore is that the effect of the 
copyright system and the choice of the rule on the transaction costs in 
question. 
 
Professor Douglas Lichtman, who made this argument to me, puts it as 
follows: 
 
"Under current law, would-be users of a copyrighted work have a huge 
incentive to find ways to lower transaction costs and in that way 
facilitate licensing.  After all, in many settings, the only way for a user 
to make his desired use is for him to overcome the transaction cost that 
stands in the way of the desired transaction.  Similarly, under current 
law, copyright holders have an incentive to find ways to lower 
transaction costs because, with lower transaction costs, a copyright 
holder could increase not only the number of licenses he signs but also 
his share of any surplus from each transaction."43 
 
The strength of this point depends on two crucial numbers: the volume and 
value of usage we are talking about.   In the world of valuable and infrequent 
proposed uses (say, a film version of a book) there are, as Lichtman suggests, 
strong reasons to want to reduce transaction costs; hence the existence of 
whole careers – agents – whose job is to do just that. 
 
But in any instance where the volume of usage is large (in the millions, 
or even approaching infinity) and the value of the usage is low, the relevance 
of dynamic transaction costs seems to disappear.  As the number of uses 
approaches infinity, any transaction cost at all will also approach infinity.   
That may be too abstract: in more concrete terms, it is hard to imagine a 
mechanism that preserves a negotiated license system that costs less than 
$10 per use (and that seems absurdly low), and when multiplied by millions, 
we again face the fact that transaction costs are the determining factor. 
 
                                            
43 See id.  
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It is possible to imagine a non-negotiated mechanism for squeezing 
transaction costs much lower – like a centralized web site with automatic 
licenses for sale – but at some point that solution simply begins to resemble a 
liability rule.   As stated above, there is nothing wrong with using liability 
rules to solve transaction costs problems, but the point of this section is to 
suggest that there are also other ways – in particular, by allocating the duty 
of notice. 
  
 3. Reducing the Pressure On Tolerated Use: 
Complements and the No Action Policy 
 
 The preceding discussion showed how and why copyright seems to be 
evolving toward an opt-in rights system for dealing with the giant gray zone 
of tolerated use.  In this last section I’ll discuss several alternatives to the 
opt-in approach that may clarify boundaries and reduce uncertainty in 
different tolerated use scenarios. 
 
 Better Treatment for Complements 
  
 One reason that many uses of copyrighted works are tolerated is that 
they cause no harm to, and in fact help, the owner of the original copyrighted 
work.  For example, if I create a film that is obscure, and a fan creates a 
loving website for the film that uses images from the film, it is probably the 
case that the fan has infringed.  Nonetheless it is also obvious that the web 
site creates value for the owner of the original work.44  In fact, many fan 
websites and other tolerated uses are exactly the kind of thing that content 
creators pay for when it is called “marketing.” 
 
 In economic terms, what the fan has created is called a complement (as 
a opposed to a substitute) – a good that makes another good more valuable.45   
For those unfamiliar with this concept, examples are plentiful. More lenses 
make my camera more valuable.  The sale of screws makes a screwdriver 
more valuable.  My coffeemaker becomes more valuable the more varieties of 
coffee are available.   And so on. 
 
 Now why is this relevant?  I am suggesting that one of the chief 
problems in the present copyright world and its patterns of mass, tolerated 
infringement is that the law is not sensitive to complementarity.  One way of 
                                            
44 See, e.g., Laura Landro, Hobbits in Cyberspace, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 21, 2000, at 
___ (discussing the relationship between New Line Cinema and Lord of the Rings 
fan sites).  
45 See R. PRESTON MCAFEE, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 2-12 (1996), 
available at http://www.mcafee.cc/Introecon/IEA.pdf (providing a formal economic 
definition of complements and substitutes). 
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helping ease the whole problem of massive casual infringement is to make 
the complementary-nature of the work more explicitly the leading determiner 
of whether a given secondary work is considered a reproduction or adaptation 
of the work under §§106(1)-(2), or fair use under §107. 
 
 We can begin with the example of a book review.   It is sometimes 
stated that a book review would be infringing if it weren’t protected by the 
fair use doctrine, particularly if it quotes from the source.46   But the prior 
question should be asked: whether a usual book review is an infringement at 
all, regardless of fair use.    
 
 The text of the adaptation right seems to suggest that the answer is to 
be “no.” The question, based on the definition of “derivative work” in §101 is 
whether the original work is either listed in the text, or in some way “recast, 
transformed, or adapted.” 47 It seems implausible to suggest that a book 
review is the adaptation or recasting of a book into a new form, in the sense 
that a novel is recast into a play.   Hence the conclusion reached by Judge 
Richard Posner in the Beanie Baby case, Ty, Inc. v. Publications Int’l, which 
asks, among other things, whether a collector’s guide to a series of stuff 
animals is a derivative work. He writes there that “a collectors' guide to a 
series of copyrighted works is no more a derivative work than a book review 
is.”48 
 
 Unfortunately, courts – in particular the Second Circuit, sometimes act 
as if anything related to or somehow borrowing from the original has been 
“recast, transformed, or adapted.”   In Twin Peaks Productions v. Publications 
International, concerning a guide to the Twin Peaks series, the court 
summarily concluded that the guide was a derivative work by simply saying 
“the Book contains a substantial amount of material from the teleplays, 
transformed from one medium into another.”49  Unlike the Seventh Circuit 
approach, the Twin Peaks approach, taken with little evident thought, turns 
almost every secondary work into a derivative work. 
                                            
46 “[E]ven substantial quotations might qualify as fair use in a review of a 
published work,” Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 
539, 564 (1985).  
47 The 17 U.S.C. §101 definition of derivative work reads “A ‘derivative work’ 
is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical 
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound 
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a 
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial 
revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, 
represent an original work of authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’”  
48 Ty, Inc. v. Publications Int’l, 292 F.3d 512, 522 (7th Cir. 2002) 
49 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993). 
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 The other possibility is that a book review is an infringing 
reproduction that is “substantially similar” to the original.   On first reading, 
the idea that a book review is a copy of a book seems plainly ridiculous 
(unless, of course, it were just a disguised abridgement of the book).   The 
question gets a bit harder if we speak of a book review that includes 
quotations from the book.  Nonetheless, while realizing some of the caselaw 
goes in other directions  (discussed below) I don’t see how it makes any sense 
to think that a book review, even with quotes, satisfies the classic idea of a 
copy being something that usurps the market for the original, by appealing to 
and drawing away the same audience.  This is the idea of a copy in the 
Second Circuit’s Arnstein v.  Porter, which says that the owner’s “legally 
protected interest is in … the potential financial returns from his 
compositions, which derive from the lay public’s approbation of his efforts.”  
The court decides infringement by deciding, “whether defendant took from 
plaintiff’s works so much of what is pleasing to the ear of lay listeners, who 
comprise the audience for whom such popular music is composed, that 
defendant wrongly appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.”50   
 
 This statement in Arnstein reflects the idea of an illegal copy stealing 
the market for the original product.   That view also anchors the work of 
Professor Paul Goldstein, whose work on the distinction between derivative 
and reproduction rights is foundational.  In his 1983 paper, Derivative Rights 
And Derivative Works In Copyright, Goldstein is in search of “the point at 
which the right ‘to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies' leaves off and 
the right ‘to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work’ 
begins.”   It is, he says “that point at which the contribution of independent 
expression to an existing work effectively creates a new work for a different 
market.”   That means that the “infringer who copies a novel verbatim 
violates only the right to reproduce, for he has created neither independent 
expression nor a new market.  But the derivative work right is infringed 
differently: “By contrast, motion pictures, translations and comic strips based 
on the novel will all infringe the derivative right because they add new 
expressive elements and serve markets that differ from the market in which 
the original was first introduced.”51 
 
But sometimes we find language that doesn’t reflect this 
understanding of what a substantially similar reproduction is – language 
that seems to focus on brute fact of reproduction of even some small amount 
of the original work, regardless of whether the result is to create a product 
that competes with the original.   Sometimes, and crucially, this language 
comes from cases that are not true cases of changing genres: they feature, 
                                            
50 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). 
51 Paul Goldstein, DERIVATIVE RIGHTS AND DERIVATIVE WORKS IN 
COPYRIGHT, 30 J. Copyright Soc. USA 209 (1983). 
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instead, two competing products, and a contest over the idea-expression 
dichotomy.  That’s why it is dangerous to misuse nuggets such as “no 
plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not 
pirate.”52   That phrase is from Learned Hand’s famous Sheldon opinion – one 
in which there was no question that the original play at issue in that case 
(“Dishonored Lady”) would be competition with the defendant’s film (“Letty 
Lynton”).  The quote pertains to the idea-expression dichotomy, not the 
question of market competition. 
   
 Other times courts, especially the Second Circuit, have loosely allowed 
the reproduction right to expand so as to cover what is really a derivative 
work.  The worst offender is the Second Circuit’s “Seinfeld” case, Castle Rock 
Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., which asks whether a 
trivia game (the “Seinfeld Aptitude Test”) infringes the copyright in the 
television show Seinfeld.53 
 
  In the Seinfeld case, the court managed to find that a trivia game is a 
copy of a TV show. The absurdity of that result seems to speak for itself.  The 
idea of finding a trivia game to be any kind of substitute for the original show 
seems laughable.   And that something is deeply wrong is obvious from the 
opinion itself, which struggles painfully with tests designed for two works 
competing in the same market, like that from Learned Hand’s Peter Pan 
(where the question is whether “the ordinary observer, unless he set out to 
detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard [the] 
aesthetic appeal [of the two works] as the same”).54  It doesn’t make any 
sense to compare the market appeal of a trivia game and TV show because 
they do not compete.  Similarly, stumped with how to compare the “concept 
and feel” of a TV show the court simply declined altogether, saying that 
works in “different genres and media, must necessarily have a different 
concept and feel.”  What the court should have said is that works in different 
genres are simply not covered by the reproduction right.   
 
 A case like Seinfeld is so confused because, at risk of repeating myself, 
it is absurd at some point to ask whether products that are not remotely in 
                                            
52 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936).   A 
similar line, “a copyright infringement may occur by reason of a substantial 
similarity that involves only a small portion of each work” comes from Burroughs v. 
MGM, Inc., 683 F.2d 610, 624 n. 14 (2d Cir. 1982), a case about competing Tarzan 
films.  
53 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998);  see also Twin Peaks Productions v. 
Publications Intern., 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding guide to TV show Twin 
Peaks infringing). 




the same market or genre are copies of each other.  It is like asking whether 
the Superbowl is a copy of “War and Peace,” or whether the LSAT is a copy of 
Star Wars – the question is nonsense to begin with.   It serves as an example 
of what Felix Cohen once described as law’s tendency to create “pseudo 
problems, devoid of meaning.”    
 
But like many such questions, the answers have a consequence.  And 
the consequence of cases like Castle Rock is to create genre-spanning 
reproduction right that helps create the mass infringement problem we’ve 
discussed in this paper, by making nearly anything that draws on the 
original an infringement of either §106(1) or 106(2), unless it is fair use.   
 
 The better approach, tracking the Seventh Circuit’s suggestions, is as 
follows.  The question of reproduction should be what Arnstein and Paul 
Goldstein suggest:  a copy is a work that misappropriates the market that the 
original product reasonably could have expected to capture.   An adaptation, 
meanwhile, is a work that is at least a partial substitute for the original 
product, in the sense of taking that product and adapting it to a different 
medium, yet retaining the basic structure and purpose of the original 
product.  And finally, a pure complement, like a book review, or yes, a trivia 
game, is outside of both the §§106(1) and 106(2) rights altogether.  
 
 Some might say that this approach strips the adaptation right of any 
scope.  The approach is certainly in tension with some of the caselaw, though 
it is supported by some as well.55  But in defense of the approach, I point out 
that the right of adaptation between media remains – preserving such things 
as film rights, translations, photocopies of magazine articles,56 and book 
versions of a ballet,57 all of which substitute in part for the original rather 
than complement it.  What would be excluded from the adaptation right 
under this reading are works which share some content but do not share the 
object of the original – like fan sites which report information about a show, 
but which cannot replace the story-telling aspect of the show itself. 
 
I don’t deny that a broad adaptation right, even one that covers 
complements, may create incentives for authors or publishers to invest more 
initially.   But a too-broad definition of reproduction or adaptation, that 
leaves nearly nothing out, creates ridiculous results as well.   As we’ve 
                                            
55 Compare Ty v. GMA Accessories, 132 F.3d 1167 (7th Cir. 1997)  and Lewis 
Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992) with Castle Rock 
Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998), Micro Star v. 
Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998) and Addison-Wesley, 207 F. Supp. at 
678. 
56 See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
57 See Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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already seen, it has created the right so broad that it is no longer even in the 
interest of owners to try and enforce it.  My suggestion is that this 
construction of the adaptation doctrine might prove a useful way for reducing 
the pressure created by great expansion of tolerated use.   It would move 
much valuable secondary usage of copyrighted works into a different category 
— such works would not be adaptations at all, and hence would not have to 
be ‘tolerated’.  Instead, they would simply be works falling outside the 
ownership of the initial creator. 
 
 Another and to my view messier approach is to more rigorously 
understand complements as generally falling under the heading of fair use.  
In brief I am suggesting that  judges should straightforwardly declare that 
uses that do not substitute for the original, and instead make the original 
more valuable, should be considered fair use, end of story.  
 
  Today this conclusion is already occasionally reached using factors one 
and four of the fair use doctrine.   Courts examine the purpose of the use, 
with particularly interest in whether it is transformative and/or commercial.  
They also ask whether the use in question will substitute in the market.64   
These questions are a way of getting at the idea that a use of the copyrighted 
work to create a complementary good should be a fair use. 
 
In the current case law, however, the approach is inconsistent and the 
results often at odds with what I have suggested.   Again the Seinfeld case is 
a good example of how wrong this can go.   The court decided the fair use 
issue by concluding that the trivia game would substitute, not for the TV 
show, but for a potential trivia game created by the owner: 
 
“…Our concern is not whether the secondary use suppresses or even 
destroys the market for the original work or its potential derivatives, but 
whether the secondary use usurps or substitutes for the market of the 
                                            




original work. … The SAT [the “Seinfeld Aptitude Test,” the trivia game] 
substitutes for a derivative market that a television program copyright owner 
such as Castle Rock ‘would in general develop or license others to develop.’”65  
 
As we discussed before, the court never figured out whether, in fact, 
the trivia game was actually a derivative work owned by the owner – and the 
statutory definition of derivative work actually puts that in doubt.   But once 
it assumes that the trivia game is a derivative work, the court’s method 
means that any secondary work inescapably must be in competition with the 
imagined derivative. 
 
It goes nearly without saying that the approach is a classic example of 
“if value then right,” whose problem is circularity.   As Felix Cohen wrote in 
1935 on the same problem in trademark, the “vicious circle inherent in this 
reasoning is plain.”  The method “purports to base legal protection upon 
economic value,” wrote Cohen, “when, as a matter of actual fact, the economic 
value of a sales device depends upon the extent to which it will be legally 
protected.”66   
 
The objection to my complement-centered approach is already hinted 
at: that if complements to original works are not well protected, the author 
may lose income.  But it is not completely clear that that is true, based on the 
definition of what a complement is.  There are costs incurred by ignoring the 
economics of complements.  By definition, the complement increases the 
value of the original work, and in a world of high volume and low value 
complements, licensing of them is difficult.  Today, many pure complements 
are already tolerated; were they clearly made legal, more might be produced. 
 
 Copyright No Action Policies 
 
 A second, related idea for clarifying and limiting ‘tolerated use’ is the 
Copyright “No Action” policy.  Here the idea is that owners of copyrighted 
                                            
65 Castle Rock Entertainment Inc., 150 F.3d at 145. 
66 Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 
Columbia L. Rev. 809, 815 (1935). 
68 See Michael W. Carroll,  Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087 (discussing 
the SEC analogy and making a proposal for an SEC-like ‘Fair Use Board’ which 
would have the power to issue No Action letters).  This government-operated 
proposal would be more favorable to secondary authors, but would require new 
legislation and would be ‘non-precedental but educational’ – which would create 
certainty for the parties directly involved, but not for others.  See id. at 1129.  
Contrast this with my proposal, where no government action is needed, and 
certainty would be created for all users of a particular work, but which depends on 
the cooperation of corporate content creators. 
Tolerated Use 
 25 
works, to the degree they accept and want to encourage limited usage of their 
works, can declare so to the world, allowing them to focus on only the most 
economically significant infringements while increasing the certainty of those 
who might want to use the works.  They can do so using a “no action policy,” 
which would describe those uses of the works to which the owner will not 
enforce. 
 
Professor Michael Carroll had this idea before me,68 and as we both 
point out, the idea is borrowed from the securities law context, where the 
Securities Exchange Commission issues “No Action Letters” in an effort to 
clear up any residual doubt that might hamper investment. Professor Carroll, 
however, recommends a government-run “Fair Use Board” to make 
determinations and issues letter.    My idea is simply an encouragement to 
private entities to issue such policies. 
 
The goal of both is the same: is to give secondary creators some clarity 
and certainty as to what they may and may not do related to a major 
commercial work.  It is designed to encourage secondary creativity that is 
both a public benefit and adds value to the original work. 
 
 What might a No Action Policy (“NAP”) look like?  I envision it as a 
simple posting on the web or elsewhere that details the secondary uses of a 
work that a secondary author can make without gaining further permission 
of the owner.   In legal terms, the copyright no action policy is a unilateral, 
non-exclusive, potentially revocable license from the media owner to all 
members of the general public who meet its terms.   The No Action Policy 
could be specific to a given work, or could be a blanket policy for all works 
owned by a given media firm. 
 
 Imagine, for example, if the NBC-Universal web site had a section 
called “Policy for Fans and Secondary Authors.”   That section would say 
something like: 
 
Policy on Fan Creations and other forms of 
secondary authorship 
  
NBC-Universal will not take any action against, 
and encourages the creation of works based on its 
copyrighted works that fall into the following 
categories: 
 
 - Non-commercial fan fiction 
 - Online non-commercial encyclopedias 
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 - Artwork depicting characters, so long as non-
commercial  
  … 
 
 The idea obviously shares some similarities with the idea behind 
Creative Commons licenses, but let me make clear a few differences.   First, 
the Creative Commons licenses are broader than what I have described here.   
Even the most restrictive Creative Commons licenses create a right to 
reproduce and distribute the work, which is a difficult thing to accept for 
firms to adopt whose business model depends on the control of reproduction 
and distribution.   Additionally, Creative Commons licenses are, for good 
reason, designed to be irrevocable.  A No Action Policy could potentially be 
changed or revoked to adjust to changing conditions, like a rise or fall in the 
profitability of the original product.  Finally, Creative Commons licenses are 
intentionally broad, applying to the entire public without exceptions.  A No 
Action Policy could be more tailored; for example, applying only to fan sites 
who agree to post certain disclaimers. 
 
In part because of these factors, Creative Commons licenses have 
primarily been adopted by individual creators and small firms.  They have 
not as of yet been attractive to large media firms that own the vast majority 
of commercially valuable copyrighted materials.  It is these larger entities 
and more commercially valuable works that might use a No Action Policy, in 
the hopes that their application to high-profile content would reduce the 





When thinking about the waves of mass casual infringement that 
characterize modern copyright, and the related rise in tolerated use, it helps 
to remember that copyright has faced challenges like this before, and will 
likely face more in the future.  To succeed copyright must adapt and 
sometimes drastically.  This paper has described the confusion created by our 
age of mass copyright infringement, described and explained how copyright 
holders are evolving enforcement practice to deal with it, and suggested a few 
new ways which courts and rights holders could clarify and simplify the 
situation. 
